We analyze the e ects of trade liberalization on rms' decisions and pro ts in a vertical product di erentiation model with countries which h a ve di erent c haracteristics. Firms decide product speci cations at the beginning of the game, in which autarky is followed by trade liberalization (whose date is anticipated). Our analysis suggests that a rm located in a large (or rich) country is the likely market leader at the trade equilibrium. This outcome might b e r e v ersed if small country rms have a strong cost advantage, transport costs are negligible, or if the large country opens its market before the small one.
Introduction
This paper analyzes oligopolistic competition between rms located in two countries having di erent sizes. It aims at uncovering the e ects of trade liberalization on product choice and pro ts obtained by the rms, and total welfare of the countries involved.
We assume that rms correctly anticipate the pace of trade liberalization and take i t into account when deciding their product speci cations at the beginning of the game. For a certain number of periods each country is in autarky. Then trade liberalization occurs, and rms compete in the international market for the rest of the time the game is played. The intertemporal pro ts of the rms are therefore a function of the speed at which trade liberalization occurs. The longer the delay with which countries decide to open their borders, the larger the impact of the autarky conditions and therefore the more relevant the characteristic of the domestic market. In such a setting, autarky and international trade are special cases of a more general situation. This is a noteworthy feature of our model, since most models of trade do not deal with intermediate situations where rms operate under autarky in some periods and under trade in others. The crucial parameter here is the speed of trade liberalization. Although we treat this parameter as exogenous and analyze the e ects of changes in it, our framework might be extended to analyze the case where the speed of trade reform can be an endogenous variable.
To study endogenous product choices, we use a simple version of a well-known partial equilibrium model of vertical product di erentiation where the burden of quality improvements falls upon xed costs (such as R&D or advertising expenditures). In the basic version of the game, where countries di er only in market size (i.e., population or per-capita income), we show that a rm from a large (or rich) country is likely to be the industry leader after trade liberalization. Indeed, the equilibrium where the market leader is a rm from a small (or poor) country either does not exist (when asymmetries are strong), or if it exists it is risk-dominated by the equilibrium where the market leader comes from the large (or rich) country. 1 In a version of the model with production cost asymmetries, the small country will become the market leader if it has a strong production cost advantage.
To understand the overall e ect on the rms' pro ts, notice that the opening of trade has two e ects on the rms. On the one side, there is a competition e ect, since rms face new foreign competitors. On the other side, there is a market expansion e ect, since with trade liberalization rms can sell in an additional market. In general the market leader, which i s m o r e l i k ely to be the rm from the large country, tends to gain more from free trade. However, rms from the small country might still bene t from trade even though they will not be the market leaders, because they can sell in a larger market than the domestic one. This happens when the asymmetry in size between the countries is very pronounced. The opposite might happen to large country's rms, which will lose from trade even though they are market leaders at the trade equilibrium, when size asymmetries are large .
We think that our analysis helps understand better the literature on gains from trade and their distribution between unequal countries. Markusen (1981) shows that trade does not necessarily increase income in both countries, if they di er in size. In his model rms (one in each country) produce homogeneous goods and compete a la Cournot when trade opens. Under constant returns to scale the large country would be an importer of the good and might lose relative to autarky. The small country is therefore the most likely to bene t from trade liberalization. The situation can change under increasing returns to scale, since the large country would have a cost advantage which might result in it being the exporter and the bene ciary of trade. With monopolistic competition, Krugman (1980) shows that workers are better o in the larger country, thanks to the role played by economies of scale. However, trade has a positive impact on both countries' welfare, since consumers bene t from larger number of product varieties. 1 Cabrales, Garc a-Fontes and Motta (1997) reports the results of an experiment on a game which i s similar to the game we use in this paper. We nd that the equilibrium where the leader comes from the large country is selected much more often by the experimental subjects than the alternative equilibrium.
In our model, similarly to Krugman (1980) , welfare is highest in both countries when trade liberalization occurs immediately. P ossible losses by rms are outweighed by consumers' gains, which come under the form of lower prices and higher average qualities. In a sense, however, we nd again Markusen's concern that trade brings about unequal gains. Despite the overall increase in welfare for both the large and the small country, our analysis underlines the possible detrimental impact that trade can have on the profitability of the rms located in one of the countries. This is an issue which has received less attention in the trade literature, even though we believe it is crucial to understand under which conditions rms have an incentive to support trade processes. 2 A paper by Anderson, Donsimoni and Gabszewicz (1989) addresses this question in the context of an oligopolistic industry with homogeneous goods. It is found there that at least in one of the two countries rms make higher pro ts under autarky than under free trade. Unlike Anderson, Donsimoni and Gabszewicz (1989) it is not always the large country rms which lose from trade.
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In our model, xed costs of quality i m p r o vements imply that the expected size of the market faced by the rms along their lifetime determines the incentive t o i n vest in quality. Unless trade is allowed from the beginning of the game and transport costs are absent, the rm located in the bigger market has an advantage (comparable to the cost advantage enjoyed in a model with increasing returns to scale) which makes it the likely high quality producer when markets open. A rm in the small country can then be relegated to low quality products and lose from trade. 4 Finally, our results are consistent with earlier work which underscores the role played by domestic demand in determining the success of the rms in the international markets. In the economic literature, this has been rst noted by Linder (1961) and then formalized by Krugman (1980) and Dinopoulos (1988) . Evidence that size (and sophistication) of the 2 This scarce attention might depend on the popularity among trade economists of monopolistic competition models. Since in these models pro ts are usually equal to zero, both under autarky and trade equilibria, the impact of trade on rms' pro tability cannot be analyzed. See also Cordella (1993) and Nguyen and Wigle(1992) for two w orks where large countries might l o s e from trade. home market demand is a possible explanatory factor of competitive a d v antages is also reported in the business literature (see for instance Porter (1990) ). Indeed, our analysis suggests that the rms which produce the higher qualities in the international markets are those which come from the larger countries. 5 A similar result was also found in Motta, Thisse and Cabrales (1995) where, however, rms did not anticipate the occurrence of trade and could only adjust their quality c hoices after an unforeseen trade liberalization had been announced. Across all the model speci cations studied here an immediate move t o wards free trade allows both countries to improve their welfare with respect to the autarky situation. However, our analysis also suggests that trade liberalization reforms might receive strong opposition from industrial groups, whenever rms' pro tability i s l o wer under trade than under autarky.
The paper is presented in the following way. In the next section, we present the general features of the game. This basic model is then studied within a simple vertical product di erentiation framework in section 3. Some extensions are considered in section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
The basic model
The world economy is composed of two countries. Country A, which w e call the large country, has a share 1 2 of the total population size S of the world. Country B share of the world population is 1 ; . Apart from this size asymmetry, and unless otherwise speci ed, these two countries are perfectly identical.
For the sake of simplicity, w e make the assumption that at the beginning of the game only two rms are considering entry into the industry we w ant to analyze. One rm is located in country A, and the other in country B. The rms are new in the industry and 5 Note that this does not imply that these rms bene t from trade liberalization. they have to decide the speci cation of the product they want to supply at the beginning of their business life. They then incur the cost of their investment in product speci cation and cannot change it any longer. Product choice is therefore endogenous and irreversible 6 .
Firms are rational agents who are able to anticipate future events correctly. In particular, they know that the two c o u n tries have negotiated a trade liberalization agreement.
For a number K of years, from time 0 to time K ; 1, the two markets will continue to operate under a regime of autarky. Starting from period K, h o wever, the two markets will be completely integrated and they will remain in a such a situation until the end of the game, 7 which occurs at time T. 8 Firms have a common discount factor, d (we m a y think that capital markets are open and therefore interest rates equalize), and the total present v alue of pro ts of rm i is:
where M i represents the monopoly pro t of rm i (i.e. the per-period pro t when trade is not open) and D i the duopoly pro t. 9 The variable which denotes the investment i n product speci cation is x i . Note that in monopoly the pro ts of rm i are independent of the product chosen by r m j . G is a function which attributes a cost to the investment made into the variety of the good. We assume that rms share the same technology G i = G j and that no other xed costs are necessary to provide a market.
The expression above can be written as:
In section 5.1 we discuss the case where rms are already established when the game starts.
7
Introducing a period of progressive adjustment to complete liberalization of trade would complicate the analysis without adding any particular element o f i n terest.
8
T can be either nite or in nite. By assuming the latter, though, we w ould have a supergame which gives rise to many possible equilibria. Under nite horizon, we a void this problem.
9
Although the notation of equation (1) does not make it explicit, pro ts depend also on prices and quantities. The choice of notation here emphasizes that the pro ts at the monopolystage do not depend on the other country's investment, while in the duopoly stage pro ts depend on both countries' investments.
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This can be done because in equilibrium during all periods of the duopoly stage the pro ts are constant and the pro ts are also constant in the autarky stage.
or, equivalently:
With an appropriate transformation of variables = Firms are in a situation of domestic monopoly throughout their life.
The reader may b e w orried about the assumption that the rms anticipate perfectly and correctly the timing of the trade liberalization process. This is a rather strong assumption for which w e can o er two justi cations. The rst one is that one may i n terpret the parameters (1 ; ) and in the equation above as the subjective probabilities the rms attach t o t h e e v ents that international trade and autarky respectively will be the prevailing ones for the lifetime of the product. Clearly, w e w ould then have to assume that rms have the same information about the likelihood of these events and therefore the probability assigned by e a c h rm to the events is independent of the rms.
Another justi cation is that the assumption about perfect knowledge of the timing of liberalization can be seen as a polar case. The other benchmark case is the one where rms are surprised by trade liberalization and do not take i t i n to account at the moment when decisions on product choices are made. This case has already been analyzed in Motta, Thisse and Cabrales(1995) and will be brie y recalled in section 5.1 below.
To h a ve a full characterization of how the speed of liberalization a ects the product choices of the rms, we turn now to the speci cation of the model.
3 Endogenous quality c hoices: the model.
We u s e a v ertical product di erentiation model 11 to analyze more in depth the game whose general features we h a ve brie y outlined above. In this section we assume that there exist no transport costs and that technology, costs and incomes (or tastes) are identical in the two countries. (We relax each of these assumptions in the next section.) Countries di er only by population sizes. We show that this game might h a ve t wo equilibria in pure strategies. In the rst equilibrium, it is the rm located in the bigger country which produces the top quality and is the leader 12 . In the second, it is the rm located in the small country. The former equilibrium always exists, the latter exists provided that the small country does not delay trade liberalization too long. Nevertheless, the equilibrium (if it exists) where the market leader comes from the small country is never selected if the concept of risk dominance (Harsanyi and Selten (1988) ) is used.
First, we present the model. Then, we analyze the equilibrium where the market leader comes from the big country. Finally, w e turn to the equilibrium where the leader comes from the small country, and we identify the conditions under which it exists. The criterion of risk dominance is then used to select between these two equilibria.
In the two c o u n tries consumers have utility function U = u; p if they buy one unit 11 See Mussa and Rosen (1978) , Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) , Shaked and Sutton (1982) , and Motta (1993). 12 In vertical di erentiation models with xed costs of quality, the rm with higher quality has the higher share of the market and enjoys larger pro ts: this justi es referring to it as the market leader, as we shall do in the remainder. In models where quality costs fall upon variable costs, rms with di erent qualities earn similar pro ts. That model would give similar results to one where products were horizontally di erentiated. In a model with variable costs of quality i t w ould be less important to study which rm is going to be the market leader, since rms with di erent quality levels would earn similar pro ts. See the working paper version of this work for an analysis of trade within such a model. of the di erentiated good and U = 0 if they do not buy. The symbols u and p denote quality and price of the good, while represents a taste parameter. The distribution of in the two c o u n tries is the same. We assume it is uniform and that 2 0 ]. The mass of consumers is given by S i in each c o u n t r y i ( i = A B), with S A S B . This amounts to saying that country A has a higher population size than country B.
Firms decide on the quality they want to produce at the initial period t = 0 . To do so, they incur a xed cost F i = ku 2 i =2. This function is widely used in this type of models. 13 We then assume that rms play i n e a c h period t the Bertrand game, for a (T + 1 ) n umber of times. 14 We can now specify the expressions of the pro ts M i and D i appearing in equation (4), just by solving the last stage of the game. In the case of monopoly, a rm faces demand q i = S i ; p i =u i . It is then straightforward that the optimal price choice for the monopolist is p i = u i =2. Correspondingly, the monopolist pro t is M i = u i S i 2 =4: Note that the higher the population size the higher the marginal pro tability of the monopolist, which w ould then have a larger incentive t o i n vest in quality. In the case of duopoly, that is when rms compete in the international market, demand faced by the top and bottom quality rm respectively would be:
q 1 = ; p 1 ; p 2 u 1 ; u 2 q 2 = p 1 ; p 2 u 1 ; u 2 ; p 2 u 2 where u 1 > u 2 : At the price equilibrium, pro ts for the top and bottom quality are:
One can check that the prices chosen at the last stage of the game by the rms are completely independent of the hypothesis of integrated vs. segmented markets. 15 Indeed, prices charged in a market depend on the parameter which is the same in both countries, 13 See for instance Motta (1993) . One may i n terpret the parameter k as incorporating the scalar term
In the working paper version we s h o w that the qualitative results are una ected by the assumption of quantity instead of price competition.
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Markets are integrated when there can be no price discrimination between them. Markets are segmented when there can be price discrimination.
while they do not depend on the market size parameter. Hence, rms would choose the same price even if they could price discriminate. Contrary to other models where the assumption of integrated rather than segmented market can change the results (see eg. Markusen and Venables (1988) ), our model is not sensitive to this assumption.
We are now able to write the intertemporal pro t functions of the rms: Recall that in the equation above S A = S and that S B = ( 1 ; )S. Next, it should be noted that we h a ve deliberately not speci ed whether the high quality rm is located in country A or in country B, and vice versa for the low quality rm. Indeed, there might exist two equilibria in pure strategies. In the rst one, it is the rm located in the bigger country which produces the top quality. In the second, the market leader is instead the rm located in the small country.
The market leader is located in the big country
When we analyze the case where the top quality rm comes from the big country A, the rst-order conditions of the problem are: We h a ve found the analytical solutions of this equation by using the program Mathematica. There is only one real root r = r( ) w h i c h satis es the constraint r > 1. By substituting r into expression (8) and using u 1 = ru 2 we nd the two qualities (u 1 u 2 ). Note that the parameters S 2 1 k enter the expressions in a multiplicative w ay and therefore do not a ect the solutions.
The solutions have been obtained under the hypothesis that country A rm produces the top quality, and country B rm the bottom quality. To m a k e sure that the pair (u 1 u 2 ) w e h a ve found is really an equilibrium, w e also have t o c heck t h a t c o u n try B rm does not nd it pro table to 'leapfrog' the rival and provide a quality higher than u 1 . In other words, it must be checked that there exists no quality u 0 1 such that 1 (u 0 1 u 2 = u 1 ) 2 (u 1 u 2 ). Likewise, it must be checked that the rm from country A does not have an incentive to deviate by supplying a quality which i s l o wer than u 2 . Indeed, it is possible to prove that these deviations are not pro table, and therefore conclude that the pair (u 1 u 2 ) i s a l w ays an equilibrium. 16 By replacing the equilibrium qualities one can obtain the expressions for equilibrium pro ts, consumer surplus, domestic welfare and aggregate welfare. 17 In particular, the expressions for consumer surplus can be obtained by substituting the equilibrium qualities into the following: Note that consumer surpluses di er across countries for two reasons. Firstly, because countries have di erent population sizes (we are computing the aggregate, and not the per-capita surplus). Secondly, because in autarky country A citizens consume the top quality whereas country B citizens have to content themselves with the lower quality. F or = :5 and = 0 , t h e t wo expressions collapse to the same.
Finally, b y using W A = 1 + CS A , W B = 2 + CS B , and W = W A + W B , country and total welfares can be found. Again, total population size, maximum taste and cost parameters play o n l y a m ultiplicative role in the equilibrium solutions. Therefore, from now o n w e normalize these values to S = 1 , = 10, and k = 1. This is without loss of generality, as the same property holds for the equilibrium with the rm from the small country being the leader. Figure 1 shows equilibrium qualities, pro ts and welfares as functions of the delay in trade liberalization, represented by the parameter , w h i c h ranges from 0 (free trade from the rst period) to 1 (autarky forever). Each curve is drawn for a given value of the parameter , which denotes the relative size of the large market. If a change of is represented by a m o vement along a given curve , a c hange in shifts the curve.
The top panels illustrate the evolution of equilibrium qualities. As for u 1 , the results are unambiguous. For any given relative market size, an increase in the speed of liberalization increases the value of the top quality. Indeed, a lower value of has two e ects which h a ve the same sign. Firstly, trade increases the size of the market (market size e ect) and thus the marginal pro tability of quality i n vestment. Secondly, it also increases the period in which the rm is exposed to competition (competition e ect). In turn, this pushes the rm to increase its product quality to di erentiate it from the other rm. Both e ects raise the incentives to provide a higher quality. F or a given trade liberalization pro le, an increase in the relative size of country A (a rise in parameter ) increases the marginal pro tability of quality, a n d t h us the incentive t o i n vest in quality i m p r o vement.
The behavior of the bottom quality, apparently less clear cut, can be understood by taking into account that (for given size of the market) the need to di erentiate in order to relax price competition pushes the low quality rm to decrease its quality level. The competition e ect takes in this case an opposite sign as the market size e ect. The opening of trade tends to decrease the quality produced by the former rm. When country B is not too small (eg. when = :5 o r = :7), the market size e ect -which in principle would tend to increase qualities by both rms -is less important. Hence, liberalization decreases the quality l e v el of the rm located in the small country. H o wever, when count r y B i s very small (eg. when it is only a tenth of the total population size, = :9), the positive e ect due to the expansion of the market which follows trade liberalization is stronger than the competition e ect, thus increasing u 2 as decreases.
The interpretation of the equilibrium pro t schedules for a given size but di erent speed in liberalization goes along the same lines. The top quality rm is the one which reaps the bene t from liberalization to a greater extent. However, when country A is very large, the expansion of the market given by trade tends to play a smaller role than the e ect of competition. (In the limit, when the size of the small country tends to zero, the rm would have to compete with a rival on a market of the same size as in autarky.) For any given speed of liberalization, an increase in the value of increases market demand and therefore the pro tability of country A rm, whose pro t function shifts upwards. Obviously, pro t shifts downwards for the bottom quality rm, since an increase in implies a decrease in domestic demand.
Consumers from both countries bene t from an increase in the speed of liberalization (which corresponds to a lower value of ) through an increased competition which tends to increase the availability o f v arieties, to reduce prices for given qualities and to increase the level of the top quality on the market. The positive e ect on consumer utility tends to outweigh the possible negative e ect on rm pro ts. Immediate trade liberalization brings about a higher welfare level than under autarky, and for both countries. However, partial trade liberalization (that is, trade liberalization after many periods of autarky) might w orsen a country's welfare with respect to the situation arising in a completely closed economy. This occurs when two countries are very similar and trade is open for few periods only. In this case the rm which is going to produce the lower quality a t equilibrium has lower pro ts than under monopoly, and trade is not open long enough for consumers' gains to o set the rm's losses (in Figure 1 , the welfare schedule W B for = :5 takes a U-shape). One important thing to note is that even though total welfare is maximized by liberalizing trade at the earliest possible date, there is always at least one rm that loses by liberalizing trade early, s o w e should expect in this context that some rm would oppose liberalization, if no compensating mechanism is implemented.
The market leader is located in the small country
In the case where the top quality rm is located in country B, the rst-order conditions of the problem become: We can then write u 1 = zu 2 (with z 1) and use the same procedure followed to derive the equilibrium solutions in the previous section. We then nd the value z = z( ) which satis es the rst-order conditions, and by substitution the candidate solution (u 1 u 2 ). However, it turns out that this is not an equilibrium for all the values of the parameters. Indeed, the rm located in the large country might nd it pro table to produce a quality u 0 1 higher than the quality u 1 the rival would produce at the candidate solution. In other words, 0 1 (u 0 1 u 2 = u 1 ) can be higher than 2 (u 1 u 2 ). We h a ve studied the optimal deviation u 0 1 that country A rm can make, and compared 0 1 with 2 . Unless the two countries have exactly the same size, it is always possible to nd a v alue of the parameter large enough for the candidate equilibrium to break down. 18 Indeed, the smaller the size of country B and the more di cult will be for its rm to be the market leader (the lower the value of which is necessary to sustain this equilibrium). In the case where = 0 e a c h rm is selling on the single market from the very beginning, and thus the reduced size of the domestic market does not limit the scope for the investment. However, as the delay in implementing the trade integration process increases (as rises), each rm produces for longer periods for the domestic market. If the size of the latter is small, the domestic rm cannot support the burden of a very high cost in quality, e v en if it anticipates that it can be the leader once trade is liberalized. In turn, this makes it easier for the rm located in the large country to`leapfrog' the rival and produce a quality which is higher.
If the argument is still not clear, consider the following extreme example. Let country B be in nitesimally small ( ! 1), so that its rm produces under monopoly a quality u M B = . If rms expect trade liberalization to occur only in a very remote period of their business lifes (alternatively, their common discount factor is extremely low), that is ! 1, the quality that country B rm might wish to produce cannot be much higher than , whereas the quality c hosen by country A rm would be close to S 2 4 . O b viously, an equilibrium with the rm coming from the small country being the leader cannot be sustained. At the other extreme, when trade is expected to be free at the outset ( ! 0), the weight of the domestic market is irrelevant, and rms will have the same opportunity to be the market leader. Figure 2 shows the equilibrium outcomes in the plane ( ): Note that the equilibrium where the leader comes from the large country (denoted by E1) always exists, whereas the equilibrium where the leader comes from the small country (denoted by E2) exists only if trade is liberalized soon enough or if the two countries are not too di ering in sizes, for the reasons we h a ve g i v en above.
For the values of the parameters such that the equilibrium E2 exists, one can then use the values of quality, u 1 and u 2 , which solve equations (12) and (13) Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium solutions (the dotted line indicates parameter values for which the equilibrium with the small country rm being the leader does not exist). As in the previous case, the results can be understood by thinking in terms of the competition and the market size e ects. A complete discussion is probably super uous. It may b e w orth emphasizing that when the rm from the large country is to be the bottom quality rm, then its pro ts are certainly going to shrink as the speed of liberalization increases. Since it comes from the large country and it produces the low quality at the open markets equilibrium, the competition e ect is always dominant (the additional market when trade opens is relatively unimportant with respect to the e ect played by the opening of competition). The opposite is true for the small country rm, which bene ts both from the expansion of the market and from being the leader.
Even in this case, welfare attains its maximum level in both countries when trade liberalization occurs from the outset ( = 0). However, similarly to the previous equilibrium case, there might b e a w elfare loss in the case of partial liberalization. In particular, this occurs for a large country whose rm is relegated to the production of a low quality (see the schedule W A when = :5), and when trade is liberalized only at a late period ( is close to 1). Here again, consumers do not enjoy free trade of goods for a long enough period to outweigh the rm's losses with respect to autarky.
By comparing the values under the two di erent equilibrium con gurations ( Figures  1 and 3) , it can be checked that the domestic welfare in each country is higher when the national rm is the market leader, which suggests that a government w ould have a n incentive to commit to help the domestic rm to gain such a position. Further, it can be noticed that total welfare is higher when the market leader is located in the large country. This is quite intuitive a result, since it is more e cient t o h a ve an equilibrium where the top quality rm spreads its investment costs over a larger domestic market.
Risk Dominance
It has been shown in Figure 2 that the game has two strict Nash equilibria, for a region of the parameters and . Standard re nements like perfectness, properness, or strategic stability do not select among strict Nash equilibria. Also, in this game there are no symmetric equilibria and no equilibrium Pareto dominates the other (taking in to account only the welfare of the players, the rms and not the consumers). There is a solution concept that selects between equilibria in our game, though. This is the criterion of riskdominance introduced by Harsanyi and Selten (1988) . Since the concept of risk dominance is de ned only for games with nitely many pure strategies we h a ve to discretize the strategy space. We will show the results obtained when the discretization is very coarse, keeping only the equilibrium strategies for the two players. The advantage of discretizing this way is that the intuition for the concept of risk dominance is stronger for the two strategy case, and its relevance is better supported theoretically and empirically (research for the case with many strategies is not as well established). It is also much simpler and faster to compute the risk dominant equilibrium in the two strategy case. The restriction does not condition the results, anyway. W e h a ve done numerical analysis (available upon request), using the "tracing procedure" of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) , that shows that the risk dominant equilibrium is the same even for a much ner discretization.
Risk dominance selects equilibria by comparing the \riskiness" of equilibrium points. This criterion compares the product of equilibrium misforecasts and the equilibrium with the largest product is the one that risk dominates. Let a 2 2 game with the following payo matrix. where the payo s are such that E 1 = ( A 1 B 1 ) a n d E 2 = ( A 2 B 2 ) are strict Nash equilibria, and let LA 1 = a 11 ; a 21 . LA 1 is the gain made by playe r A b y predicting rightly that the other player will play E 1 (and best responding to the prediction) instead of predicting wrongly that the other player will play E 2 (and best responding to the prediction).
Similarly, let LB 1 = b 11 ; b 12 .LA 2 = a 22 ; a 12 .LB 2 = b 22 ; b 21 . W e s a y that equilibrium E 1 risk dominates equilibrium E 2 when LA 1 LB 1 > L A 2 LB 2 .
Besides the intuition and the axiomatization provided by Harsanyi and Selten , there are more reasons why risk dominance could be considered a good equilibrium selection criterion (see Kandori, Mailath and Rob(1993) and Carlsson and Van Damme(1993) ). Perhaps the most appealing argument for risk dominance is that in the experiments perfomed by Cabrales, Garc a-Fontes and Motta (1997) , Guyer and Rapoport (1972) and Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil(1990) the risk dominant equilibrium is the one selected by actual players.
Let E 1 be the equilibrium where the big country rm is the leader and E 2 be the equilibrium where the small country rm is the leader. Recall that A is the big country and B is the small country.
In our case a 11 = 1A (u 1 u 2 ), a 21 = 1A (u 1 u 2 ), a 12 = 1A (u 1 u 2 ), a 22 = 2A (u 2 u 1 ), b 11 = 2B (u 1 u 2 ), b 21 = 2B (u 1 u 2 ), b 12 = 2B (u 1 u 2 ) a n d b 22 = 1B (u 2 u 1 ).
In our case, LA 1 is what player A gains by forecasting rightly that the other player will play the equilibrium where A itself is the leader, instead of forecasting wrongly that the other equilibrium holds. LA 2 represents the gains for player A of forecasting rightly that the other player will play the equilibrium where B is the leader. The interpretation of LB 1 and LB 2 is analogous. Figure 4 shows that we h a ve LA 1 LB 1 LA 2 LB 2 , and the equality only holds when = 0, that is, when liberalization occurs at the earliest possible date. Thus, for the game we are studying the risk dominance criterion selects the equilibrium where the leader is the large country rm, except in the limiting case where the two countries liberalize the markets immediately ( w h e n = 0).
Equilibrium selection can be interpreted in strong way a n d i n a w eaker way. The strong interpretation is that we will never (or rarely) observe players choosing the strategies that lead to an equilibrium that is not selected. The weaker interpretation is that the likelihood of observing players using the strategies that lead to each equilibrium is related to the di erence LA 1 LB 1 ; LA 2 LB 2 . The larger this di erence, the likelier it is that we will observe players using the E 1 strategies. We feel that the weaker hypothesis is more reasonable, not only because it is more di cult to reject, but also because most of the reasons in favor of risk dominance involve uncertainty or bounded rationality (see Harsanyi and Selten (1988) p.89), and in these circumstances it would be hard to expect the strong hypothesis to be satis ed. In our game, this interpretation would amount t o saying that the more asymmetric the two country sizes, the less likely to observe the E 2 equilibrium, namely the equilibrium with the leader coming from the small country.
Conclusions
In this section we h a ve analyzed how market size and the speed of trade liberalization a ect the equilibrium outcome of a game where rms take product quality decisions by correctly anticipating the occurrence of trade. The analysis suggests that the rm coming from the large country would be the likely market leader. Indeed, when country sizes di er substantially, i t w ould be impossible for the small country rm to be the leader. Further, we h a ve seen that the equilibrium with the large country rm being the leader is always selected by the risk dominance criterion. Although the risk dominance concept as an equilibrium selection criterion is open to discussion (especially because the selection power of this criterion is probably higher when asymmetries are not too weak), this result does support the idea that the leader under trade would tend to be the large country rm.
Transport costs, and other extensions
In this section, we relax some of the assumptions we h a ve made so far. Armed with the analysis carried out for the benchmark model, it will be easy to deal with some extensions. First, we analyze the case of positive transport costs. Second, we study what happens when countries di er in their citizens' propensity t o p a y (that is, in their tastes) for quality, instead of population sizes. Third, we relax the assumption that rms have identical production costs and identical technologies for the improvement of product qualities.
Transport costs
We h a ve so far assumed zero exporting costs. This is clearly a useful assumption, albeit a strong one when dealing with international trade. We n o w i n troduce positive transport costs, modeled as \iceberg costs". This formalization implies a proportional reduction of the quantity that can be sold abroad with respect to the quantity produced. For example, if a rm ships to the foreign market a number q of units of the good, only q=g (with g 1) units arrive at destination in the foreign market. This amounts to saying that foreign sales give the exporting rm a unit revenue of p=g which i s l o wer than the price p paid by foreign consumers. Monopoly pro ts for the rms are obviously unchanged, while duopoly pro ts for the top and the bottom quality rms with positive transport costs are (for i j = A B i 6 = j g Note that even when transport costs are positive equilibrium prices do not depend on the assumption of segmented v. integrated markets. This is because transport costs a ect only market sizes, which i n turn do not a ect rst-order conditions at the price stage of the game. By comparing the expressions above with expressions (5) and (6), one can see that transport costs reduce the relative pro tability of the small country rm. Duopoly pro ts are now m ultiplied by ( S A + S B g ) for the rm located in the large country A, and by (S B + S A g ) for country B rm, while both were multiplied by ( S A + S B ) in expressions (5) and (6) with no transport costs. Given that S A S B and g 1, it follows that (S A + S B g ) (S B + S A g ). Ceteris paribus, transport costs give an advantage to the large country rm, which enjoy a larger captive market. By reducing pro tability of the small country rm, this limits its incentive t o i n vest in quality. Hence, it will be more di cult for this rm to be the leader at equilibrium. Figure 5 shows this e ect: When transport costs rise (g = 2 in the gure) the area where the small country rm can be the leader at equilibrium (E2) is reduced with respect to the case of no transport costs (g = 1 ) .
Note also that while in the benchmark case (zero transport costs) the equilibrium with the rm from the small country being the leader always existed if trade liberalisation was immediate ( = 0), this is no longer true in the case of transport costs. Actually, liberalising trade at the rst period is not enough to guarantee that the two rms are playing on a level ground: the large country rm enjoys the advantage of a larger domestic market even if trade occurred from the rst period. For large enough transport costs and large enough country di erences the equilibrium E2 does not exist even if trade occurs at the very beginning of the game.
Di erent preferences for quality, or incomes
We h a ve analyzed so far the case where consumers in two countries have identical average propensity t o p a y (or taste) for quality ( A = B = ), with countries di ering only in their population size. Since in vertical product di erentiation models a relationship can be established between taste for quality and income (see Tirole(1988,p.86 )), we m a y interpret the case treated so far as one where countries have similar per-capita income but di erent population size. If trade occurs between countries of similar population size but di erent per-capita incomes (or di erent propensities to pay for quality), that is A B and S A = S B , it is straightforward to see from the pro t expressions that we w ould have similar results to those obtained above. Market A still gives rise to larger demand for the good under monopoly and this gives its rm a better position in the international market. Two equilibria still arise but the one where the leader comes from the small country ceases to exist when the di erence between the two countries is above a certain threshold (that is, when A is much larger than B ) and is always risk-dominated by the other equilibrium. This explains why in the paper we refer to country A indi erently as the rich or the large country. 
Asymmetries in Costs
We analyze rst the case of asymmetry in the unit costs of production, and then the case of asymmetry in the costs of developing the quality of the goods.
Let us start with the case of asymmetry in production costs. If the large country has also a production cost advantage (for instance, because of cheaper labor), this strengthens the e ect of the larger domestic market for country A's rm. Since both asymmetries increase its pro tability and incentive t o i n vest in quality, i t s c hances to be the market leader at equilibrium are higher. The case where the small country rm has a production cost advantage is less trivial. The market scale e ect helps the large country rm, whereas the production cost e ect favors the small country rm. It is the relative magnitude of these two e ects which determine the equilibrium solutions of the game. As we show below, if the cost advantage is high enough, there is a unique equilibrium where the small country rm is the leader.
We will now assume that the production of a given good requires some units of that same good, with the same level of quality u i , as an input in the production process (think of farmers using seeds or computer manufacturers using computers). This is the only additional cost we i n troduce to the costs assumed in previous sections. The more ine cient is the rm (the higher its production costs), the fewer the units of the good which are obtained as a nal output from any given number of initial units of the good.
Let us write gross pro ts of rm i as i = p i e i q i , where e i is the e ciency parameter in the production process, or an inverse measure of production costs (with 1 e i 0) and where p i and q i are as usual the price and output of rm i. The parameter e i acts simply as a rescaling factor on both duopoly and monopoly pro ts and we can write the intertemporal pro t functions of the rms in the presence of production costs as: Without loss of generality w e x e B = 1 e A . The e ect of higher unit costs in country A is to increase the range of parameter values for which the equilibrium with the small country rm being the leader exists and to decrease the range for which the equilibrium with the large country rm is the leader exists. We can have three possible situations. If size asymmetries are large and cost asymmetries are small, we nd only the equilibrium of type E 1 (leader in the large country) for low enough size and cost asymmetries both equilibria exist nally, for low enough size asymmetries and large enough cost asymmetries, only the type E 2 equilibrium (leader in the small country)
exist. 21 Figure 6 represents this e ect in the same space ( ) as the previous graphs. The lower e ciency of count r y A ( e A = :7) implies that the area where only the equilibrium with the large country rm being the leader (E1) exists shrinks relative to the case of identical production costs. There also exists a region where this equilibrium disappears altogether. 22 As for the costs of developing the quality of their goods, we h a ve so far assumed that rms have identical abilities in research and development o r a d v ertising activities.
This amounts to assuming that the parameter k in the quality improvement function is identical for both rms (k A = k B = k). If di erences in R&D or advertising technologies were in favor of country A, these would reinforce the country size advantage, and the results would just be strengthened. The interesting case is therefore the one where the rm from the small country B is more e cient i n i n troducing innovations and improving quality, so that k A k B . T o simplify the analysis and focus on quality cost asymmetries, we assume that unit production costs are the same in both countries. It turns out that this case is very similar to the one just discussed where rms have identical quality costs but 21 We h a ve not applied the risk dominance criterion to try and select one of the two equilibria in the region where both exist. This is because in the presence of one additional (cost) parameter the problem becomes even more cumbersome.
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This occurs when is close to 1 and countries are not so di erent ( close to :5). To understand why this happens, consider the extreme case where = 1 ; and = :5. In this case, trade opens only at the very last period of the game and equilibrium qualities under liberalization cannot di er much from autarky ones. But since under autarky we h a ve u A = ( e A =4)(S=2) di erent production costs. The reason is that the parameter k i enters multiplicatively the cost expression in the intertemporal pro t function, while e i enters multiplicatively the gross pro t term in the same function (recall that i = e i M i (u i )+e i D i (u i u j );k i G(u i )). As a result, a higher k i a ects equilibrium solutions in qualitatively the same way a s a lower e i , all other things being equal. Hence, the discussion made for the case of di erent unit costs still holds for the case of di erent quality costs. If the rm coming from the small country has an advantage in quality development costs, this might outweigh its market size disadvantage. The stronger its cost advantage, the earlier trade liberalization and the less unequal country sizes, and the more likely that country B's rm will be the leader at the equilibrium (and in turn the less likely that there exists the equilibrium with country A's rm being the leader).
5 Discussion, and conclusions
In this section we rst discuss the role played by some of the assumptions we h a ve used. Then, we m a k e some concluding comments.
Trade liberalisation with adjustments of quality
Throughout the paper we h a ve assumed that at the moment the game starts rms have never invested nor produced. How does our analysis change if prior to the game the rms have already selected a product quality? Consider the following scenario. At period t = 0 each rm j is producing a quality level u j , with j = A B. This initial quality level is exogenously given and may depend on various historical accidents, past levels of R&D activities, advertising expenditures and so on. The game is then played as described before (K periods of autarky and T ;K of trade) with the di erence that rms can update their quality levels at a time t by incurring some adjustment costs. To h a ve a speci cation as close as possible to the one adopted above, assume a quadratic cost function of quality improvement: (u j ; u j ) 2 =2. The model can then be analyzed in the same fashion as we have done in the previous sections. Motta, Thisse and Cabrales (1995) studied the case where initial qualities coincide with the quality a r m w ould adopt if it were operating in autarky and did not know trade would open at some date in the future ( rms can update qualities when unexpected trade integration occurs). As in the present paper, they nd that two equilibria might arise, that the equilibrium with the leader being in the small country exists only if country asymmetries are not large, and it is always risk dominated. The similarity with the results obtained here is reassuring and suggests that more sophisticated models which c o m bine the features of the two settings would not give v ery di erent results. 23 5.2 Number of rms, free entry, and welfare
The assumption that there are only two rms in the industry simpli es our analysis considerably. It could be rationalized if there exist important set-up costs which prevent a larger number of rms from operating in the industry. Allowing for a larger number of rms would increase the indeterminacy of the equilibrium outcomes. For instance, if two rms come from country A and one from country B, then we w ould have equilibria where country B rm might produce the top, medium or bottom quality. The analysis of the existence of the equilibria and the application of the risk dominance criterion would be considerably more complex, but it is unlikely that this would add much to the analysis.
We h a ve also assumed in our basic duopoly case that there exists a rm in each country. This assumption might not be innocuous and the welfare conclusions obtained in the standard case above m i g h t be a ected. In particular, the trade impact on the welfare of the large country might be negative if most or all the rms operating under free trade were located in the small country. As an illustration, consider the case where 23 An example of such r i c her models could be one where rms play a " rst-autarky-then-trade" game but could decide on two distinct qualities for each con guration: a quality for the domestic market and another quality for the international market, when it opens. If the latter can be developed improving upon the initial quality ( b y p a ying an adjustment cost), then this model would combine the two settings just discussed in a unique but more complex framework.
there exist no transportation costs and where at most two rms can operate at the free trade equilibrium, whereas only one rm can operate under autarky. If = 1, that is under autarky, it is easy to check that the welfare of the large count r y i s g i v en by 2 S 2 4 =16. If = 0, that is if both countries open immediately to free trade, there exists the possibility that both rms operating at the trade equilibrium come from the small country. If this is the case, then the large country would lose all its pro ts, and its welfare would coincide with the consumer surplus of its citizens, which is given by :0432 S 2 4 . One can then check that trade leads to a welfare loss in the large country if > : 69. In other words, if a country is much larger than the other and none of the rms operate in it under (immediate) free trade, then the loss of autarky pro t outweighs the consumer's gains.
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This example looks truly like a knife-edge case. It would be enough to assume that transportation costs are di erent from zero, for instance, to give a n a d v antage to the rms located in the large country, and reestablish a relationship between the size of the market and the nationality of the rms operating at the trade equilibrium. Nevertheless, it is possible that the study of models with many rms yields further surprises. We leave this subject for future research.
Although our analysis suggests a welfare improving role for free trade, the reader should be aware that gains from trade do not necessarily arise in any v ertical product di erentiation models. In the papers by Shaked and Sutton (1984) and Motta (1992) a country's welfare might decrease following a trade liberalization process. This di erent outcome deserves an explanation. In those models, the possible adverse e ect of trade mainly depends on the fact that the so-called \ niteness property" holds there. As market size increases, a larger number of rms cannot coexist in the industry. Hence, when trade opens (that is, as the size of the market rises), some of the rms formerly operating in autarky have to exit the industry. Since some rms disappear at the trade equilibrium, free trade can have a dramatic impact as the loss in rms' revenues can outweigh consumers gains. In our model instead, the niteness property does not hold and trade liberalization 24 See Motta (1992) for a similar result. has a less dramatic impact on rms pro ts, and hence on countries' welfare.
Di erent dates of market opening
Although optimistic as for the welfare e ects on each c o u n try as a whole, our model also illustrates the danger that trade liberalisation might represent for a rm coming from poorer, smaller or less technologically advanced countries. The analysis shows that such a rm is likely to be relegated to production of a lower quality at equilibrium: the equilibrium where it is the leader might not exist if asymmetries are large enough or, if it existed, it would be risk-dominated. It is still possible that such a rm might gain from trade liberalisation, in some circumstances. For instance, this happens when a country is much smaller than the other, rms are otherwise symmetric, and transport costs are not important. Overall, though, our analysis tends to underline the risks that a rm coming from a poorer or a smaller country (other things being equal) might run. 
where A and B are a measure of the delay with which trade is liberalised in each country.
It is straightforward to see that the longer B with respect to A the stronger the possibility for the small country rm to become the leader, since its marginal pro tability of an investment in quality rises. Even though a full policy analysis is beyond our intentions, it should be noted that a delayed opening date for the small country might not be recommendable in general. First, we know that rms located in very small country gain from trade even if they are relegated to production of lower quality goods (see Figure 1) because of the importance of the market expansion e ect. Therefore, there would be no reason to grant them a longer period of protection on their domestic market. Second, by looking at the impact of trade liberalization from a broader perspective than the one allowed by our formalization, we should consider the possibility of adverse e ects of longer protection of a country's rms. For instance, today's protection might lead to tomorrow's demands for further delay in liberalization of the market. Third, it is not clear why the large country government, or its rms, should accept di erent opening dates for the two economies. This calls for the study of a bargaining game played by the two countries over the dates of liberalization of each economy. But this sort of issues would be better analyzed by a fully edged political economy model than in the simple model we h a ve proposed here.
Conclusions
Our model underlines that domestic market size plays an important role in determining the success of rms in the international markets. Indeed, both the analysis of the existence of equilibrium outcomes and the use of risk dominance as the criterion for equilibrium selection suggest that a rm coming from a large (or rich) count r y i s t h e l i k elier market leader under free trade, unless it su ers from strong cost disadvantages (and transport costs are negligible).
Our analysis indicates that even if a country as a whole gains from trade, there is always a rm which loses from trade. This rm can be located either in the large or in the small country, depending mainly on the magnitude of factors such as relative sizes of the country, di erences in costs and the delay with which the process of trade liberalization is carried out. We consider the analysis carried out here as a step towards a better identi cation of the forces which h urt (or bene t) rms under processes of trade liberalization. We feel this is a necessary step to understand the conditions under which rms oppose (or favor) such processes.
